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THE EMERGING AMERICAN POLICE STATE:  
THE PROBLEM IS NOT WITH THE POLICE,  
BUT HIGHER UP 
William E. Nelson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent police shootings have focused public attention on the role 
of police in American society.1  There is much talk about the need to 
reform police practices and thereby control the misuse of police power.2 
This article argues that concern with reforming the police will not 
fully deter the emergence of an American police state or significantly 
reduce the misuse power of by law enforcement agencies.  The police are 
not the problem; the problem is higher up.  Undoubtedly, there are rogue 
police officers who commit heinous acts, up to and including murder.  
There are rogues in every occupation.  Steps are needed to minimize the 
number of rogues, although they can never be entirely eliminated.  It is 
far more important to pay close attention, not to occasional rogue police 
 
*Edward Weinfeld Professor, New York University School of Law.  The author is indebted to 
R.B. Bernstein, Bernard Freeman, Robert Kaczorowski, Frank Stewart, and Larry Zacharias 
for their comments and suggestions.  The author is especially indebted to his attorney, Peter 
Carrozzo, who discussed this article while it was in draft and read and commented on the final 
version.  Together Carrozzo and the author stood by in astonishment at actions of the Parking 
and Traffic Violations Agency, sometimes laughed as officials of the agency provided material 
for this article, but always worried what impact the actions of those officials would have had 
on us if we were poor people or people of color.  This article was written in the winter and 
spring of 2016, when the author anticipated that Hillary Clinton would be the next president 
of the United States and would lead an administration committed to protecting the environment 
and the rights of minorities.  The article will have greater utility when such an administration 
comes into power. 
1 Christopher E. Smith, The U.S. Supreme Court and The Nation’s Post-Ferguson 
Controversies, 6 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 53, 54-56 (2016); Jeffery T. Wennar, 
The United States Is Not a Police State; There Needs To Be Restoration Of The Criminal 
Justice System Through Adjustment In Order To Alleviate Discontent Expressed By The 
American Public, 6 WAKE FOREST L.J. & POL’Y 371, 381-82 (2016). 
2 Ian Loader, In Search of Policing: Recasting The ‘Peelian’ Principles, 10 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 
427, 432 (2016).  
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officers, but to the institutional structures and institutional actors other 
than police on the beat who support, engage in, and indeed, strive to 
legitimate roguish law enforcement behavior. 
On February 21, 2015, while driving my car, I was apprehended 
by a police officer and given a summons for failing to stop at a stop sign.  
The officer, who happened to be African-American, was businesslike, 
polite, and efficiently doing her job.  Because I believed that the 
particular stop sign I was charged with passing is illegal and that the 
enormous proliferation, in general, of stop signs in my locality is also 
illegal, I entered a plea of not guilty. 
Over the course of a long and complex proceeding resulting from 
my not guilty plea, I observed conduct on the part of lawyers and judges 
that I found improper, and even authoritarian.  Throughout my career, I 
have written legal history and refrained from writing about my personal 
experiences with the law.  My experience in this particular proceeding is 
trivial in comparison with negative experiences that others have suffered 
with law enforcement authorities.  But I believe my experience and 
observations in this proceeding potentially offer insights into why the law 
enforcement system, though not necessarily police officers themselves, 
increasingly appears to function like an authoritarian police state and 
why many Americans, especially Americans of color and other minority 
groups, increasingly find the legal system unfair, unjust, and oppressive.  
I hope my report of my experience will help readers to identify why this 
is so as well as to define what differentiates an authoritarian police state 
from a polity governed by the rule of law. 
In this article, I plan to describe the conduct I observed in detail 
and leave it to readers to agree or disagree with my judgment about its 
improper and authoritarian quality, as well as to speculate as to why the 
conduct occurred.  I bear no malice toward any of the individuals 
involved; indeed, I owe them a debt of gratitude for providing me with 
data about what I believe to be serious flaws in the system of law 
enforcement.  Accordingly, I will do my best to leave individuals 
unidentified and will not offer my conclusions why each of them acted 
as they did.  But I do have hypotheses about why they so acted.  I will 
offer those hypotheses now so readers can keep them in mind as they 
read my narrative of the facts. 
My first hypothesis is that the actors I observed are not as skillful 
as one ideally might want them to be.  More importantly, the institutional 
structures in which they function do not enable them to pool their skills 
and work together toward reaching sound results. Legal practice, if it is 
2
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to be performed well, requires joint analysis and discussion, and it is 
unclear whether the individuals considering my case had anyone with 
whom to talk, think, and strategize. My hypothesis is that typically they 
were acting alone.  As a result, I am not sure how well they understood 
the legal claims and issues I was presenting to them. 
The second hypothesis is that the actors I observed are 
overworked and burned out.  They are burdened with a tremendous 
workload, they worked hard to obtain the offices they now hold, and most 
are in the final years of their careers.  My hypothesis is that they have no 
further ambition except to close the office and go home at 5 p.m. 
The third hypothesis is that the actors I observed are enthralled 
by the power they hold and understand that it needs to be used to control 
lawbreakers who threaten, if they are not controlled, to undermine the 
stability of society.  They do not see the defendants who appear before 
them as equal citizens entitled to fair treatment and respect.  Under this 
hypothesis, there is no tolerance for disagreement, for difference of 
opinion, or for the possibility that the actions of those in power might be 
mistaken and that the opinions of those they coerce might be right; there 
is no possibility of compromise, of discussion, of pluralism -- of live and 
let live. 
My fourth hypothesis is that the actors I observed have a different 
conception than I have of the institution in which they work and of their 
role as officials of that institution.  I want to understand them as judges 
and public servants.  I want to understand judges as neutral arbiters bound 
by law and charged with making impartial judgments about the facts, 
arguments, and issues presented to them, and other government officials 
as officers of the law striving to achieve justice and the public good.  My 
hypothesis is that they see themselves as cogs in a bureaucracy charged 
with raising as much revenue for state and local government as possible 
at the lowest possible cost and with the least possible expenditure of 
bureaucratic energy.  Their job, under this hypothesis, is simply to raise 
ever-increasing revenue so that their political bosses have sufficient 
funds to support government and to continue to claim that they did not 
raise taxes. 
 
My third and fourth hypotheses arguably combine into a fifth and 
final one.  This final hypothesis is that the structure of local government, 
together with the general structure of American politics, favors insiders 
and discriminates against outsiders.  Local governments are controlled 
by local residents, legislate in the interest of those residents, and ignore 
3
Nelson: The Emerging American Police State
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017
712 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 33 
the concerns of outsiders, who cannot even participate in local 
governmental processes.  At the national level as well as local levels, 
people of color and other minorities do not participate in politics and, at 
times, are prevented from participating at the same level of engagement 
at which insiders participate. According to this hypothesis, the judges and 
other officials who administer and enforce the law, who are chosen 
through the political process and responsible to controlling political 
forces, simply cannot be the sort of impartial arbiters striving for the 
public good that I imagine them to be.  They must do the bidding of the 
political forces that made skewed law and granted them offices to enforce 
it. 
II.       THE UNDERLYING SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES 
A. The Basic Facts 
I received my summons for a stop-sign violation in Cedarhurst, 
Nassau County, New York, a small municipality, less than one square 
mile in size with a population according to the 2010 census of 6,592.3  It 
has fewer than 150 intersections and either a traffic light or at least one 
stop sign at over 130 of those intersections. Approximately 45 
intersections have all-way stop signs that require drivers who approach 
the intersection from any direction to stop.  I received the summons at 
one of the many all-way stop-sign intersections.  The usual penalty if a 
defendant pleads guilty to a stop-sign violation is a fine of $233 plus three 
points on his or her license;4  if a motorist receives an excessive number 
of points over a period specified by statute, his or her license is 
suspended.5  Points can also result in an increase in insurance premiums.6   
A motorist who pleads not guilty, however, is directed to attend 
a plea bargaining conference with an official from the Nassau County 
Traffic and Parking Violations Agency.  Hundreds of ticketed motorists 
 
3 Census 2010 Total Population Cedarhurst Village, New York, THE UNITED STATES 
CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2016). 
4 Fine Assessment, NASSAU COUNTY LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK, 
https://www.nassaucountyny.gov/1939/Fine-Assessment (last visited Sept. 28, 2016).  
5 About the NYS Driver Point System, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, 
https://dmv.ny.gov/tickets/about-nys-driver-point-system (last visited Sept. 28, 2016). 
6 How Driving Record Points Affect Car Insurance Rates, DMV.ORG 
http://www.dmv.org/insurance/how-driving-record-points-affect-auto-insurance-rates.php 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2016).   
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and over ten agency officials are in the conference room at each session.  
There is no bargaining and no conferring. One of the officials on duty 
simply offers to reduce each charge to a lesser violation, in my case jay-
walking with a $180 fine and no points in return for a plea of guilty.7  It 
is a generous deal for motorists, who avoid potential license suspensions 
and increases in insurance premiums.  The government also gets most of 
its money.  A standard Pareto-improvement.  But one has to wonder how 
effective the deal is in accomplishing the safety goal of the point-system 
established by the legislature -- namely, getting drivers who persistently 
violate traffic regulations off the road.   
My conference occurred on May 27, 2015.  It was the first 
occasion on which I had appeared at any official location or had any 
contact with any judicial or agency official.  I rejected the proffered deal 
and stated that I wanted my summons dismissed.  The official, without 
any discussion, told me to file a motion to dismiss promptly.  In fact, the 
New York Criminal Procedure Law requires that motions to dismiss be 
filed within 45 days of arraignment.8  I filed my motion on June 16, 22 
days after my initial appearance -- what I understood to be my 
arraignment.  I offered three grounds in support of the motion. 
B. The Minor Issues 
The first ground grew out of a FOIA request I submitted to the 
Village of Cedarhurst, the municipality in which I was ticketed.  I asked 
the municipality to produce copies of any records in its possession, 
including records of Village Board meetings and traffic engineer reports, 
in connection with the placement of stop signs at the intersection in 
question.  The municipality’s clerk responded that the “record of which 
this agency is legal custodian cannot be found.”  An old decision of the 
New York Court of Appeals, Lee v. City Brewing Corp.,9 holds that, in 
the absence of a municipal ordinance authorizing the placement of stop 
signs, there is “no evidence . . . that failure to stop, if there was any such 
failure, was in violation of any ordinance.”10  The court continued that, 
“since no ordinance was proven nor did it appear by what authority the 
 
7 These statements in the text are based on personal observation.  
8 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 255.20 (McKinney 2016). 
9 18 N.E.2d 628 (N. Y. 1939).   
10 Lee, 18 N.E.2d at 631; Accord, People v. Fenton, 259 N.Y.S. 913, 917 (Cnty. Ct. 1932); 
People v. Yerman, 246 N.Y.S. 665 (Cnty. Ct. 1930) cf. People v. Guthrie, 30 N.E.3d 880, 883 
(N.Y. 2015) (stating that there was no prosecution permitted for passing parking field stop 
sign that is not properly registered).  
5
Nelson: The Emerging American Police State
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017
714 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 33 
sign was erected,” no basis existed for finding that the defendant had 
violated the law.11  In my case, Lee would mean that, because I had 
violated no law, the prosecution would have to be dismissed. 
The third ground of my motion grew out of the deposition I 
requested when I returned my summons with a plea of not guilty.  New 
York law requires a police officer to provide a supporting deposition if a 
defendant requests one, and I requested one.12  Such a supporting 
deposition must contain “factual allegations of an evidentiary character 
which support or tend to support the charge or charges asserted in the 
simplified traffic information,”13 and which are sufficient to “apprise the 
defendant of the specific acts and occurrences which constitute the 
offense in his particular case.”14  “A supporting deposition is, therefore, 
often vital to a defendant in order to prevent surprise at the time of trial 
and to enable him to prepare his defense.”15  A supporting deposition also 
“should distinguish the charge against the defendant sufficiently so that 
no subsequent charge will be made for the same offense.”16  “Otherwise, 
. . . a defendant’s due process rights might be violated.”17  A Uniform 
Traffic Ticket does not serve either purpose because it is “invariably a 
bare statement of the offense charged.”18 
In my case, the traffic ticket charged me as follows:19 
 
THE PERSON DESCRIBED ABOVE IS CHARGED 
AS FOLLOWS 
Time                  Date of Offense          In Violation of 
1:46 p.m.                 02/21/15           NYS V and T Law 
Description of Violation 
Fld to Stop @ Stop Sign 
Place of Occurrence 
Washington Ave/Summit Ave 
C/T/V Name                              County 
Cedarhurst                                 Nassau 
 
11 Lee, 18 N.E.2d at 631-32. 
12 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.25 (McKinney 1996). 
13 People v. Born, 634 N.Y.S.2d 915, 916 (Just. Ct. 1995).  
14 People v. Hust, 346 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Broome Cnty. Ct. 1973). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id.  
18 Id. 
19 Traffic Ticket (on file with author).  
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 33 [2017], No. 3, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/4
2017 THE EMERGING AMERICAN POLICE STATE 715 
 
The ticket then gave some coded information and directions about how 
to plead. 
The deposition20 I received was a printed form, with blank spaces 
for the police officer to fill in.  I reproduce the relevant parts here, with 
the material in the blank spaces underlined. The deposition stated that the 
individual who signed it was  
a police officer and the complainant in the captioned 
proceeding, and I further allege on my personal 
knowledge and observation the following facts that 
provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant 
committed the offence(s) charged. 
 
The traffic violation was committed by the defendant on 
the 21st day of February, 2015 at 1:46 p.m. at the 
location of Washington Ave/Summit Ave. in the village 
of Cedarhurst Nassau County, New York did violate 
1172A of the VTL State of New York 
To Wit:  I did observe the above defendant William 
Nelson operating a 2014 Honda NY registration 
DJF4792 on a public highway, violating the below 
statute: 
FO1000CQG8 - 1172A - failed to stop at a stop sign. 
 
I argued that the deposition contained no factual allegations of an 
evidentiary character and added nothing to the bare statement of the 
offense charged in the Traffic Ticket. 
In particular, I argued that the deposition did not identify which 
of the four stop signs at the intersection of Washington Ave. and Summit 
Ave. I allegedly failed to stop at.  Presumably, I was being charged in the 
alternative with failing to stop at one or another or another or another of 
the four; not with failing to stop at all four at the same time.  According 
to People v. Quentin:21  
Obviously it is improper to charge alternatives 
in an information.  A defendant may not be accused of 
having done one thing or another.  Therefore . . . one or 
 
20 Deposition (on file with author)  
21 People v. Quentin, 296 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1968). 
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the other should be pled, not both, unless the defendant 
is accused of doing both prohibited acts, in which case 
‘and’ . . . should be used.22 
I then noted that rules requiring proper allegation of facts in a criminal 
information, such as the one in the Quentin case, also apply to traffic 
tickets and supporting depositions.23  Thus, it was improper to charge me 
in the alternative and not to identify at which one of the four stop signs 
at the intersection of Washington Avenue and Summit Avenue I had 
allegedly failed to stop. 
I concluded that a deposition that discloses no evidentiary facts 
whatsoever and merely reiterates the allegations made in the Uniform 
Traffic Ticket is the equivalent of no deposition at all.  A prosecution 
must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction when no deposition is provided 
in a timely fashion,24 and should also be dismissed when a deposition is 
a bare form disclosing only what has already been contained in the traffic 
ticket.  I cited several cases.25   
If my motion to dismiss had been granted on either of these 
grounds, the case would not have made significant new law.  If those 
grounds had been the only issues present, I probably would have 
accepted the $180 deal and pleaded guilty to jay-walking.  As I would 
painfully learn, it simply is not worth the trouble of litigating on 
unimportant issues on which the government is clearly wrong.  It is easier 
simply to pay tribute. 
C. The Major Environmental Issue 
But my case involved an important issue.  I expected to lose on 
the issue, but I thought the issue important enough to be worth litigating 
in order to raise awareness and eventually bring it to public attention.  
The importance of the issue is one reason for writing this essay.  The 
other, more important reason is what the bureaucracy’s reaction to my 
raising questions about an important issue reveals about the increasingly 
authoritarian nature of the American state. 
The issue I sought to raise is both an economic and an 
environmental one.  Starting up a car after stopping at a stop sign hugely 
 
22 Id. at 447. 
23 See People v. Kramer, 285 N.Y.S.2d 763, 765 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1967).   
24 People v. Nuccio, 575 N.E.2d 111, 112 (N.Y. 1991). 
25 See People v. Zappula, 970 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Muttontown J. Ct. 2013); People v. Brady, 768 
N.Y.S.2d 157 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2003); Born, 634 N.Y.S.2d 915; Hust, 346 N.Y.S.2d 303.  
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increases fuel consumption.  My 2014 Honda tells me how many miles 
per gallon I am getting from my gasoline as I drive.  So, I decided to 
conduct an experiment.   
Many streets in Cedarhurst have stop signs at every intersection, 
Washington Avenue being one of them. I started up at one .4 mile section 
of Washington Avenue, made a complete stop at three intersections with 
stop signs, attained a maximum speed of 30 mph., and had mileage of 
12.1 miles per gallon.  I conducted the same experiment on a similar road 
with no stop signs, and had mileage of 25.9 miles per gallon.  In short, 
the presence of stop signs on Washington Avenue more than doubled my 
consumption of gasoline.  At $40 per tank, it is worth getting caught 
every few months and paying the $180 tribute demanded by the police 
state.  
But this is only the beginning.  I am not alone in needing twice 
as much gasoline to traverse Washington Avenue.  Everyone else also 
needs to double their consumption.  Without the proliferation of stop 
signs in Cedarhurst and numerous other municipalities,26 motorists 
would use somewhat less gasoline, the demand for gasoline would 
decline, and so would the price.  More important, carbon emissions might 
decline, and global warming might slow. I do not know how great the 
impact on gasoline prices and global warming would be if all stop signs 
in the United States not needed for safety were removed, and I do not 
know how often other municipalities copy the Cedarhurst practice of 
putting signs at ninety percent of intersections.  But the practice is not 
unusual.  What I do know is that the practice must not be permitted to 
expand and, indeed, it must be rolled back. 
Federal law and policy support my concern that gasoline must be 
conserved and carbon emissions reduced.  In 1975, Congress enacted the 
Energy Policy and Conservation Act,27  recently amended by the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007.28  Congress’s goal, as stated in 
the preamble to the 2007 act, is “[t]o move the United States toward 
greater energy independence and security . . . [and] to protect 
consumers.”29  Congress aimed to achieve that goal through “a major 
 
26 William E. Geist, Trying to Put the Brakes on Stop Signs, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 1981), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/02/15/weekinreview/trying-to-put-the-brakes-on-stop-
signs.html.  
27 Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6201 (1975).  
28 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C. § 17001 (2007).  
29 Id.  
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program to bring about improved motor vehicle fuel efficiency.”30  At 
the time of the writing of this article, the United States, at a summit in 
Paris, had signed an international agreement to reduce carbon emissions 
and global warming, which would have obtained legal force through 
executive orders and the enactment of federal regulations.31 
Federal law is the supreme law of the land and often preempts 
state law,32 even if, as is true with the 1975 act, Congress has not 
specifically legislated preemption.33  The controlling case is Geier v. 
American Honda Motor Co.,34 where the Supreme Court repeated the 
basic test that applies when Congress has not explicitly provided for 
preemption.35  The Geier test calls for “pre-empting state law that ‘under 
the circumstances of th[e] particular case . . . stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.’”36  The general issue I sought to present by pleading not 
guilty was whether and to what extent federal law regulating energy 
markets and protecting the environment preempts state law controlling 
the flow of traffic when that state law obstructs the attainment of 
Congress’s regulatory and environmental ends. 
It is not a simple issue.  Municipalities need power to place stop 
signs at intersections where a high risk of collision exists if a vehicle 
enters an intersection without stopping and observing that it is safe to 
cross.  “The purpose of a ‘Stop’ sign,” according to New York’s 
Appellate Division, “is to require a vehicle approaching an intersection 
to stop at the corner . . . where visibility is adequate to assure safety in 
undertaking the crossing.”37 
Many stop signs, however, are installed for reasons other than 
safety.  Of the more than 140 intersections in Cedarhurst, only thirteen 
do not have either a traffic light, of which there are fewer than 25, or at 
least one stop sign.38  How did Cedarhurst manage to obtain so many 
 
30 General Motors Corp. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 898 F.2d 165, 167 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990). 
31 Coral Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/world/europe/climate-change-accord-
paris.html?_r=0. 
32 See McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 326-27, 360-61 (1819).  
33 Id. at 328, 330, 344, 353, 356-57, 360-61. 
34 529 U.S. 861, 867 (2000).  
35 Id. at 867. 
36 Id. at 861. 
37 McLean v. McKinley, N.Y.S.2d 154, 156 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1953), rev’d on other 
grounds, 120 N.E.2d 842 (N.Y. 1954).  
38 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 15, § 2328.68 (McKinney 2016). 
10
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stop signs -- at least one on nearly every corner -- that often appear to 
have no safety function? 
The Village Administrator explained it.  Past practice in 
Cedarhurst was that, when a resident requested the installation of stop 
signs at an intersection near his or her home, the Village Board, after 
giving due notice to the residents of Cedarhurst, would hold a public 
hearing.39  If most of the residents present at the hearing supported the 
installation of a sign or signs, out of a feeling, which was typically 
unsupported by evidence from an engineering study, that their street 
corner would be safer, the Village would make the installation.40  The 
 
39 Interview with Salvatore Evola, Cedarhurst Village Administrator, in Cedarhurst, N.Y. 
(2016). 
40 In the Town of Hempstead, which like Cedarhurst is a municipality in Nassau County, the 
process for the installation of stop signs, in essence, is the same.  It typically begins with a written 
request by a local resident for signs, followed by a public hearing and then by a vote of the town 
board to install the signs.  But there is one additional step.  Before the public hearing, the town’s 
Department of General Services conducts a traffic survey.  Unfortunately, the department ignores 
the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (“MUTCD”), as is apparent in connection with 
the installation of several new stop signs during the past year in the Cedarhurst vicinity. Manual 
on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FEDERAL HIGHWAY 
ADMIN., http://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov (last modified July 1, 2016). 
One new installation occurred two blocks northeast of Cedarhurst on Central Ave., 
a main thoroughfare and bus route, where a person who remains anonymous requested all-way 
stop signs at the intersection with Linden St.  The department wrote: 
As a result, surveys conducted various days at various times of the 
day found the request for additional stop signs warranted.  There is a 
“school” located on the corner of Linden St. and Central Ave.  Also, there 
is a lot of pick-up and drop-off activity at different times of the day where 
there are high volumes of traffic using this street as a cut-through with few 
stops.  High approach speeds were also observed. The additional stop 
signs at this location will enhance public safety for motorists and 
pedestrians as well. 
The above recommendation is vague and inconsistent with the guidelines of the MUTCD.  No 
school is visible on the corner of Linden St. and Central Ave.; only single-family houses can 
be seen.  Perhaps a child is being home-schooled?  But is that a reason to install a stop sign 
for the next 30 or more years?  Traffic volumes are high, but are they consistently high enough 
to meet MUTCD standards?  Speeds are also high, but the MUTCD explicitly states that stop 
signs should not be used to control speed. Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices 
(MUTCD), U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMIN., http://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov 
(last modified July 1, 2016). 
A second set of all-way stop signs was anonymously requested at the intersection of 
Sturl Ave. and Harris Ave., about a mile distant from Cedarhurst.  All the traffic survey 
recommendation said is that, “after numerous traffic surveys, this department recommends 
additional stop controls at this location for public safety.  The area in question has many 
children and is used as a cut-through from Peninsula Blvd. to Broadway in Hewlett.” There is 
no mention of any of the MUTCD guidelines. 
A third set of all-way stop signs was anonymously requested at the intersection of 
East Broadway and Ocean Ave. in Woodmere, which is midway between Cedarhurst and 
11
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process was a highly democratic one, in which the people of the polity 
decided what they wanted and the polity obeyed.  Expertise played no 
role. 
But note the one-sided nature of this democratic process.  It 
respected the sentiments of local residents who received notice of and 
attended the hearing, but it gave no weight to the costs, economic and 
environmental, that stop signs imposed on outsiders, who did not even 
have notice that a law detrimental to their interests was being adopted.  
Drivers along Cedarhurst’s streets from outside the village later found 
their gasoline mileage cut in half and occasionally got ticketed and fined 
when they failed to stop at signs. Those drivers were thus subjected to 
real monetary costs.  But they had neither a forum in which to oppose the 
law nor notice that the law was under consideration; they were simply 
excluded from the democratic process. 
Similarly excluded were people like the Inuit of Alaska and the 
residents of Battery Park City in lower Manhattan. Global warming -- 
arguably a product of increased carbon emissions produced by policies 
like Cedarhurst’s proliferation of stop signs -- has led to the flooding of 
their communities.41  The environment inevitably suffers when people 
 
Hewlett.  According to the Department of General Services, “several surveys conducted 
various days at various times of each day found the request for additional stop signs warranted 
in that road geometry and high volumes of traffic during the day may create sight distance 
issues for motorists egressing onto East Broadway from Ocean Ave.” There was already a stop 
sign warning motorists on Ocean Ave. not to egress onto East Broadway, which is a straight 
road for a considerable distance, without first stopping and checking that it was safe to egress.  
Apparently, additional signs were needed on East Broadway to make it more convenient for 
drivers on Ocean Ave. to egress.  But the MUTCD contains no guideline in reference to such 
convenience, and convenience seems entitled to little weight in comparison with the reasons 
of the federal government for conserving gasoline. 
A final set of signs was placed approximately one-half mile northeast of Ocean Ave., 
where East Broadway makes a sixty degree turn to the left and becomes Franklin Ave.  No 
other streets intersect with the single roadway at the point of the bend.  Some anonymous 
person, however, contacted this office prior to case being assigned to the writer for a stop sign 
installation at the intersection of East Broadway and Franklin Ave. in Hewlett. As a result, it 
is the opinion of this department that stop signs are warranted for “public safety.”  This is a 
highly trafficked roadway with limited sight distance and it was also observed that this was 
not a curve in the roadway but a turn where stop controls should be placed.  Again, one 
wonders what happened to the MUTCD. 
41 Laurel Andrews & Jerzy Shedlock, Flooding Continues in Galena, Alaska., ALASKA 
DISPATCH (May 30, 2013), http://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2013/05/30/flooding-
continues-in-galena-alaska/; Joe Weisnenthal, Several Inches Of Flooding Already On Battery 
Park Boardwalk In Manhattan, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 28, 2012 9:43AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/hurricane-sandy-flooding-battery-park-in-manhattan-2012-
10; Joe Weisenthal, Stunning Images of Manhattan Underwater, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 29, 
2012, 7:40 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/battery-park-flooding-2012-10; See also 
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1189-
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like the residents of Cedarhurst adopt short-sighted policies that appear 
to bring them immediate advantages without taking into account long-
term environmental consequences to others. Local democratic processes 
rarely provide effective mechanisms for weighing the externalities that 
local decisions will impose on the environment at large.  
Finally, political processes such as Cedarhurst’s have disturbing 
distributional consequences.  Cedarhurst is a relatively wealthy 
community.  According to the 2010 census, its residents have a median 
household income of $87,353 compared to $51,144 for the nation and 
$55,712 for New York state as a whole.42  Nonresidents driving through 
Cedarhurst must spend extra money on gasoline or get ticketed for 
passing stop signs so as to improve the comfort level and perhaps the 
property values of Cedarhurst residents, who believe that stop signs at 
nearly every intersection make their streets safer.  This constitutes a 
disturbingly regressive redistribution of wealth and well-being from 
poorer to richer people.   
Given that the poor are disproportionately people of color, 
Cedarhurst’s proliferation of stop signs also has troubling racial 
consequences.  Cedarhurst’s residents, according to the census, are 87.8 
percent white, and only 2.2 percent African American, 3.6 percent Asian 
American, and 1.8 percent Latino from Mexico, Puerto Rico, or Cuba;43 
the nonresidents who drive through Cedarhurst, to the extent they reflect 
national averages, are significantly less likely to be white and more likely 
to be people of color.44  This means that wealth and well-being are being 
redistributed from people of color to white people.  This redistribution 
does not occur because the people of Cedarhurst are racist; nearly all of 
them, I believe, are not.  But one need not be a racist to harm racial 
minorities.  Often, the only step that white people need to take is to pursue 
their own self-interest in a political process like that of Cedarhurst from 
which minorities, because they are in this instance nonresidents, are 
excluded.  Minorities will thereby be abused not by racist whites but by 
an arguably racist system.  And, they will be angered. 
 
91 (9th Cir. 2008) (giving citations to further sources discussing the causes of global 
warming).  
42 Quick Facts, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/ 
PST045215/3613233 (last visited Sept. 29, 2016). 
43 Community Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/ 
nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (search “Cedarhurst Village, N.Y.” and then select “Race and 
Hispanic or Latino Origin” from the “2010 Census” menu) (last visited Sept. 27, 2016).  
44 Quick Facts, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/ 
PST045215/3613233 (last visited Sept. 29, 2016). 
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Because there are good reasons why local sentiment should not 
always govern the placement of stop signs, I needed to know whether 
such sentiment had governed the placement of the signs at the 
intersection of Washington Ave. and Summit Ave.  It was for that reason 
that I asked the Village of Cedarhurst for records concerning the 
placement of the signs at that intersection.  I needed to identify what 
genuine safety concerns, if any, had justified the village’s action.  When 
the village failed to locate any records and thereby identify any safety 
concerns, I turned to another source so as to speculate on whether 
possible legitimate concerns might exist. 
In its Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (2009 ed.), 
which the website posting the manual declares that “States must adopt 
. . . as their legal State standard for traffic control devices. . . [,]”45 the 
Federal Highway Administration has adopted guidelines that define what 
constitutes a dangerous intersection in need of control by a stop sign.46  
The federal guidelines are detailed and complex.  In essence, they 
prohibit the use of any stop signs unless an engineering study shows that 
the combined vehicular, bicycle, and pedestrian volume entering an 
intersection from all approaches averages more than 2,000 units per 
day.47  They prohibit the use of all-way stop signs, which is what exists 
at the intersection of Washington Ave. and Summit Ave., unless an 
engineering study shows that the vehicular volume on the more major 
street averages 300 vehicles per hour during any 8 hours of an average 
day and the combined vehicular, bicycle, and pedestrian volume on the 
lesser street averages 200 units per hour during the same 8 hours.48  They 
further provide that “[s]top signs should not be used for speed control,” 
and that stop signs should not be installed on the higher volume roadway 
of an intersection unless justified by an engineering study.49  These 
federal guidelines, of course, are not fixed rules, but merely guidelines 
that may be disregarded if an engineering study, or perhaps some other 
 
45 Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FEDERAL 
HIGHWAY ADMIN., http://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov (last modified July 1, 2016). 
46 Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), MUTCD with Revisions 1 and 2, 
May 2012, § 2B.04, 2B.05 at 50-53 (2009 ed.), U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMIN., 
http://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/pdfs/2009r1r2/mutcd2009r1r2edition.pdf. 
47 Id. at 50. 
48 Id. at 52.  
49 Id. at 50.   
14
Touro Law Review, Vol. 33 [2017], No. 3, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/4
2017 THE EMERGING AMERICAN POLICE STATE 723 
body of evidence, identifies a reason, such an obstacle to visibility, for 
not following them.50 
Exactly how binding, however, are the guidelines?  Can a stop 
sign be enforced if there was no engineering study, or indeed, no 
evidence whatever of a safety need, supporting its installation?  Does it 
matter whether a municipality installs numerous signs with no safety 
justification, or only a few -- whether it routinely ignores federal law or 
does so only occasionally without making a proper record?  If a 
municipality fails to install signs at an intersection where federal 
guidelines authorize them and a motorist, as a result, is involved in a 
collision and suffers serious losses, is the municipality liable in damages 
if the motorist who struck the injured motorist is judgment proof?  Who 
is liable for what if two motorists both fail to stop at all-way signs that 
are not authorized under the federal guidelines, and a fender-bender 
results?  Other similar issues might be framed.   
These issues might seem theoretical and academic, but as a result 
of the 2007 case of Byrne v. City of New York,51 they are not.  In Byrne a 
motorist who was injured in a collision at an intersection on Staten Island 
sued New York City for negligence because it had failed to place a stop 
sign at the intersection52  Relying on the Manual on Uniform Traffic 
Control Devices, the city’s defense was that it was not negligent because 
under the federal guidelines there was not enough traffic at the 
intersection in question to justify placing a stop sign there.53  The court 
upheld the city’s defense and ruled that the city was not negligent.54 
Thus, issues about the relationship between federal guidelines 
and state and municipal regulatory power are very much alive.  It seems 
clear under Byrne that federal guidelines have some sort of binding legal 
force in New York.  The exact nature of that force is an important issue 
that one would think lawyers and judges would perceive a need to 
resolve.  Wouldn’t it be better to resolve the issue in a low-stakes case 
like mine rather than a major accident case in which a municipality 
potentially faced a large dollar verdict? 
 
50 U.S.  DEP’T OF TRANSP. & HIGHWAY ADMIN. Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices 
(MUTCD) Knowledge Overview, http://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/ (last modified July 28, 2015).  
51 Byrne v. City of N.Y., 851 N.Y.S.2d 56 (Sup. Ct. Richmond Co. 2007). Cf. Ophir v. City of 
Boston, 647 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D. Mass. 2009).  
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III.  THE BEHAVIOR OF PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES 
Accordingly, I expected the prosecutor in the Parking and Traffic 
Agency to file a response to my motion to dismiss, addressing the 
significant issues I had presented.  I assumed that, because I was required 
to file a copy of my motion with the prosecutor, he or she would serve a 
copy of any response on me.  Why else did the prosecutor need a copy 
of my motion to dismiss?  Doesn’t due process prohibit ex parte 
interactions between the prosecutor and the judge?55  Doesn’t due 
process give me, at the very least, a right to notice of those interactions? 
I received nothing from the prosecutor.  Instead, some six weeks 
after I had filed my motion, I received a ruling from the court, possibly 
on a motion of the prosecutor or at least with the knowledge and consent 
of the prosecutor, given without any notice to me.  The entire order 
follows:  
I have reviewed the papers submitted in support of this 
motion. 
Defendant’s motion for an order dismissing the 
Simplified Traffic Information(s) herein is DENIED. 
Defendant’s motion is untimely. 
                                                            [Judge’s Signature] 
 
I was now confused.  After doing further research, I learned that 
the Traffic and Parking Violations Agency takes the position that 
arraignment occurs, not at the time of a defendant’s first appearance 
before the agency, but when a defendant returns a not guilty plea and 
requests a supporting deposition.56  By that standard, my motion to 
dismiss was untimely.  Of course, the Uniform Traffic Ticket contains 
no notice that the time of arraignment will be moved forward by several 
months if a defendant requests a deposition. 
I was also confused about a deeper issue.  What was the 
significance of the words, “Defendant’s motion is untimely”?  Had the 
 
55 See 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 100.3(B)(6) (McKinney 2016); Haller v. Robbins, 409 F.2d 857 (1st 
Cir. 1969). 
56 See People v. Sirkin, 553 N.Y.S.2d 593 (Arcadia J. Ct. 1990), adopted in Nassau County, 
People v. Rose, 794 N.Y.S.2d 630 (Dist. Ct. 2005). Both cases, especially Rose, involved lengthy 
delays by defendants, and both courts carefully analyzed the facts to explain why, as a matter of 
fairness, a request for a deposition should be deemed an arraignment under the facts.  The Traffic 
agency, however, has adopted the practice of treating a request for a deposition as a fixed, 
unalterable, black-letter rule without any announcement; only attorneys who regularly practice 
before the agency can possibly know that it is a rule. 
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judge denied my motion because it was untimely, or had he denied it on 
the merits and noted, in addition, that it was untimely?  Or had he denied 
it on both grounds?  If he had denied the motion only because it was 
untimely, I could still present at trial the legal claims raised in the motion. 
Of course, I would need to call witnesses to build an evidentiary record 
in support of my claims, at considerable inconvenience to me, the 
witnesses and the trial court.  But, if the judge had denied the motion on 
the merits, I would be precluded at trial from relitigating issues already 
decided, although I would be able to appeal to a higher court if the trial 
judge entered a judgment of conviction.57 
I decided to seek clarification from the Traffic and Parking 
Agency.  I asked a police officer at the entry to the agency where to go 
for clarification, stood as he directed for about a half-hour on a long line 
of people paying fines, and eventually spoke to a man behind the 
payment window.  He politely tried to help, but didn’t understand my 
confusion.  He then offered to obtain someone else’s help.   
About ten minutes later, another man appeared and handed me a 
business card that identified him as the Hon. [Anonymous], the executive 
director of the agency.  I explained my confusion.  He asked me if I was 
an attorney.  I responded that I was a retired attorney.  He told me I had 
two choices and then asked me what those choices were.  I didn’t have a 
clue.  The Hon. [Anonymous] then informed me I was in a state of bliss.  
I was even more confused and stood like a deer on a dark highway with 
headlights shined into its eyes.  My bliss, according to the Hon. 
[Anonymous], resulted from my ignorance, because, as he added, 
ignorance is bliss.  I then responded that he was not being very helpful.  
From there the conversation went further downhill.  I felt increasingly 
intimidated, and finally I expressed an opinion that the Traffic and 
Parking Agency seemed more interested in collecting money than in 
deciding a question of law.  To this the Hon. [Anonymous] responded 
that there would be a trial.  I, of course, wanted a trial, but the Hon. 
[Anonymous] spoke in a fashion I found angry and threatening, not 
reassuring.  He had made it plain that he possessed the power of 
knowledge and that he was not going to share it. 
It was clear I needed help.  I asked an attorney I knew to 
recommend a firm that handles traffic prosecutions, followed his advice, 
and spoke to a lawyer at the firm.  The lawyer gave some useful advice, 
but when I inquired whether the firm would be willing to represent me, 
 
57 Developments in the Law Res Judicata, 65 HARVARD L. REV. 818 (1952).  
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the lawyer indicated the firm could not because it had a good relationship 
with the Traffic and Parking Agency that enabled it to obtain especially 
excellent deals on behalf of its clients.  Supporting me in my adversarial 
conflict with the Agency would endanger that relationship.  The lawyer 
also advised me to accept whatever deal the Agency offered since I 
would get no relief from what the lawyer referred to as a “Kangaroo 
Court.” 
I did not follow that advice.  I decided to petition the Agency 
Court for clarification and reconsideration of its order denying my 
motion to dismiss.  I did not expect reconsideration, but I did think the 
motion judge would need to clarify his order so that the trial judge would 
know what he had decided.  My petition was brief and to the point: 
Defendant respectfully petitions the Court to 
clarify its order of July 9, 2015 to specify whether it 
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the merits 
or solely on the ground of untimeliness.  A copy of the 
order is attached.  The most obvious reading of the July 
9 order is that the motion was denied because it was 
untimely.  However, the order might also be read as 
denying the motion on the merits and noting in addition 
that it was untimely.  The meaning of the order will 
matter when the defendant seeks to introduce the 
substance of the material contained in the motion to 
dismiss as defenses at his trial. 
 
Assuming the motion was denied solely on the 
ground of untimeliness, defendant also petitions the 
Court to reconsider its denial.  Section 255.20 of the 
Criminal Procedure Law, which is made applicable to 
local courts by section 170.30, gives a court discretion 
to consider a motion to dismiss filed after the 45-day 
period, and good reason exists for so exercising 
discretion in this case.  Defendant could not file his 
motion in its complete form until after the Village of 
Cedarhurst responded on June 12 that it could not find 
any of the FOIA information he had requested; he then 
filed the motion promptly, only four days thereafter.   
 
More importantly, the interests of justice and 
efficiency of judicial administration cut in favor of 
18
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determination of the issues herein on a motion to 
dismiss, rather than in the midst of trial.  The motion to 
dismiss raises serious, difficult issues about the power 
and duties of local municipalities, especially vis-a-vis 
the national government.  They are issues that are not 
going to disappear.  Defendant strove to draft the 
motion in a form that would enable the Court, subject 
to the right of both parties to appeal to a higher court, 
to address the issues on a clear record and with 
sufficient time to analyze that record.  Defendant 
thought it would be less efficient to present the issues 
at what would become a lengthy trial where there would 
be little time to analyze them and from which the 
prosecution might be barred from appeal. 
 
Accordingly, defendant urges the Court to take 
his motion to dismiss under consideration and to give 
an opportunity to the Traffic Prosecutor, as well, 
perhaps, as the Village Attorney of Cedarhurst, to 
submit whatever written arguments they may wish to 
submit in opposition to the motion before the Court 
decides the motion on the merits. 
 
Again, I submitted my petition in duplicate, one for the court and 
one for the prosecutor.  Again, I never received a response, which due 
process arguably requires, from the prosecutor.  Three weeks later, I 
received the following from the court: 
 
I have reviewed the documents submitted in support of 
the motion to reargue and find no grounds upon which to 
grant the motion. 
Defendant’s motion for an order permitting a re-
argument of the original motion is DENIED. 
                                                            [Judge’s Signature] 
 
Did the judge ever read the one-page Petition for Clarification 
and Reconsideration, to which no additional documents were attached?  
Did the judge realize that he had failed to decide half of what was asked 
of him?  Or did he respond to my petition simply by mailing out one of 
several available preexisting, computerized forms, none of which happen 
19
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to be an appropriate response to a petition for clarification?  At this point, 
as I confronted the emerging American police state, I could only 
conclude that I needed to retain counsel so as to engage in the cut-throat, 
hardball litigation that I foresaw coming.  And I wondered what an 
African-American, Latino, recent Asian immigrant, or poor white 
person, who unlike me does not have a law degree, would conclude when 
confronting the same police state. 
I accordingly decided to retain as counsel a former student and 
experienced lawyer, Peter M. Carrozzo, who does not, however, practice 
before the Traffic and Parking Agency.  That decision, in retrospect, 
turned out to be one of the wisest I ever made:  it saved me from 
suspension of my driver’s license and from possible arrest.  But could a 
poor African-American, Latino, recent Asian immigrant, or poor white 
who lacked the resources, knowledge, and personal contacts that I 
possess have made the same decision? 
The case next turned into a comedy that in the absence of counsel 
would have been tragic for any of those people just mentioned who could 
not have retained an attorney.  My attorney filed a notice of appearance 
and directed that all correspondence be sent to him.  The next piece of 
correspondence set a trial date of December 29, 2015.  But it oddly 
identified not me but New York University School of Law, which I had 
given to the Traffic and Parking Agency as my business address, as the 
defendant; it made no reference to me whatsoever.  Fortunately, the 
correspondence was mailed to my attorney.  But, if it had been sent to 
New York University School of Law without my name appearing on it, 
the law school administration would have had no way of knowing who 
the correspondence was for.  It would have been buried in some circular 
file.  And I, or someone else without an attorney, would have failed to 
appear for trial, would have been found guilty by default, and would have 
had my license revoked, and a bench warrant would have been issued for 
my arrest. 
On December 3, my attorney, Peter Carrozzo, duly filed a motion 
to dismiss for the misnaming of the defendant, but the Traffic and 
Parking Agency failed to act before the December 29 appearance date.  
Counsel and I accordingly appeared on December 29 as someone had to 
do to avoid entry of a default judgment.  When we met with an assistant 
prosecutor, Carrozzo argued that the case should be dismissed because a 
defendant should be required to make only two appearances and we 
already were making our second appearance due to prosecutorial error.  
The assistant prosecutor, however, did not grasp the argument:  the 
20
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concept that the Traffic and Parking Agency might have some 
responsibility for its careless mistakes seemed never to have occurred to 
her.  The assistant prosecutor could only state an agency rule that, 
because a motion to dismiss was pending, the case could not go to trial 
and would need to be postponed.   
Carrozzo then asked if we could obtain clarification of the motion 
judge’s July 9 rejection of the original motion to dismiss.  He indicated 
that clarification would save time for everyone who would be involved 
in the future trial.  The prosecutor was not prepared to discuss this matter, 
and she directed us to appear before one of the judges who was on duty 
to finalize the order postponing the case. 
While we were waiting to appear before the judge, we overheard 
conferences between assistant prosecutors and other defendants.  It is 
noteworthy that nearly all the defendants we observed were members of 
racial or ethnic minorities.  One of the most interesting was a young 
Asian-American man who had received two parking tickets carrying 
fines over $200.  It was obvious that the young man believed that the 
issuance of the tickets had been erroneous and unjust.  The prosecutor 
offered a significantly reduced fine but then added that the young man 
would also need to pay a driver responsibility fee of $30 -- a euphemism 
for a tax that everyone appearing before the Traffic and Parking Agency 
must pay, even if they were in the right and they are found not guilty.  
The young man had a difficult time understanding why he should pay 
$30 for a police officer’s error, and, as I looked around the room at the 
apparently poor members of minority communities waiting to discuss 
their cases, I wondered what necessities their families would forego as 
those in court laid out $30 apiece to pay for police officers’ mistakes.  
And as I focused on the Asian-American ethnicity of the defendant in 
front of me, I also imagined I had been transported from the United States 
of America to the Peoples’ Republic of China.  My imagination, in turn, 
enabled me to understand more clearly than I had in the past the 
difference between China, where people know that they must respect 
power and dare not even question it, and America, where we like to think 
that power respects law. 
Next counsel and I appeared before the judge.  Carrozzo argued 
that the case should be dismissed because we should be required to make 
only two appearances and we were now, due to prosecutorial error, 
making our second appearance.  He also sought to obtain clarification of 
the motion judge’s July 9 rejection of the original motion to dismiss.  The 
judge on the bench noted that he was not the motion judge, could not 
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know what the motion judge had meant by his order, and hence could not 
clarify it.  The judge then asked the assistant prosecutor whether I had 
been offered a reduced plea to a charge of jaywalking, to which the 
assistant prosecutor responded that the offer had been made and rejected.  
As the judge was becoming impatient and incredulous about my rejection 
of the prosecutor’s generosity, Carrozzo again tried to explain our 
argument.  The judge quickly interrupted, “Give me a break.  Don’t waste 
more of my time and your client’s time.”  I doubt that it ever occurred to 
the judge that what was being wasted was not my time, but my faith in 
the rule of law. 
The end result was that the case was postponed indefinitely 
pending disposition of the December 3 motion.  For over a month, 
counsel and I heard nothing.  Then, in late February, Carrozzo received 
a notice dated January 29 scheduling a mid-March trial date; the notice 
again named New York University School of Law as the defendant and 
did not mention me at all.   
Carrozzo and I immediately prepared yet another motion to 
dismiss, renewing all prior motions and noting, in particular, the agency 
rule that a matter could not go to trial while a motion, such as our 
December 3 motion, was pending.  We planned to file the new motion 
on February 29, but as Carrozzo was preparing the papers for mailing, he 
received the following document, dated February 17, 2016 and 
denominated People against “WILLIAM NELSON, New York 
University School of Law,” which I quote in part: 
 
I have reviewed the papers submitted in support of this 
motion. 
Defendant’s motion is GRANTED and the above-
referenced ticket(s) is/are hereby DISMISSED. 
                                                            [Judge’s Signature] 
Our new motion, of course, was never sent. 
Although I am pleased with victory, I remain confused and 
troubled with the manner in which the Nassau County Traffic and 
Parking Violations Agency dealt with my ticket.  One source of trouble 
is the clerical carelessness and lack of communication within the agency.  
New York University School of Law should never have been named as 
defendant; surely, after counsel and I had informed the agency of its error 
in our December 3 motion and at the December 29 hearing, the Law 
School should not have been named as defendant a second time.  
Nonetheless, the January 29 notice of a trial date so named it.  Indeed, 
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given the agency’s rule that a trial cannot be held while a motion is 
pending, the January 29 notice should never have been sent at all.  Do 
the clerks in the office not communicate with each other? 
I am even more confused and troubled by the decisions of the 
judge who decided all three of our motions -- the two motions to dismiss 
and the petition for clarification.  The December 3 motion to dismiss for 
misnaming New York University School of Law as defendant contained 
no citations and offered no compelling legal argument.  Why did the 
judge grant the motion?  Why didn’t he simply direct that the misnomer 
be corrected, that New York University School of Law be dismissed as 
a defendant, and that the case proceed against me?  
Perhaps, the judge so acted because of the following 
complication.  University counsel decided not to appear in court or to 
appoint Peter Carrozzo to appear on the Law School’s behalf, and 
Carrozzo indicated in his affidavit in support of the December 3 motion 
that he did not represent the Law School.  He thus moved to dismiss only 
on my behalf; no one moved to dismiss on the Law School’s behalf.  
Could the judge have denied Carrozzo’s motion and still have dismissed 
the Law School from the case when no motion was made on its behalf?  
Is the law so formalist in character that it prevented the judge from doing 
what made sense?  Did formalist considerations really require him to 
dismiss the entire case in order to dismiss the Law School? 
Another possibility is that the judge agreed that I and my attorney 
should not be required to appear more than twice.  The general practice 
of the Nassau County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency is to require 
no more than two appearances.58  But I have been unable to locate either 
legislation or case law requiring that the practice be followed, and none 
was cited in the December 3 motion. 
While I thank the judge for granting the dismissal and am 
satisfied that his reasons for doing so were valid ones, I remain convinced 
that there was even more reason to grant my earlier petition for 
clarification.  The judge’s order denying my first motion to dismiss was 
ambiguous, and the ambiguity had to be resolved.  The issues raised by 
the first motion were not going away, and someone ultimately would 
have been required to decide whether the motion was denied as untimely 
or the issues therein decided on the merits.  I remain puzzled why the 
judge granted a motion that did not need to be granted -- the motion to 
 
58 See Traffic & Parking Violations Agency, NASSAUCOUNTYNY.GOV, 
https://www.nassaucountyny.gov/1928/Traffic-Parking-Violations-Agency (last visited Sept. 
30, 2016). 
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dismiss for the misnomer, but denied a request for clarification that some 
judge ultimately would have had to decide. 
Perhaps there was another reason for granting the December 3 
motion to dismiss while denying prior ones.  Might it be that when the 
judge saw the motion papers, he remembered the earlier motion and 
petition and began to see the case in its entirety?  Might he have then 
realized that the substantive issues raised in the first motion would not 
go away?  If so, did he then wonder how it would be possible to avoid 
deciding them?  And didn’t the December 3 motion to dismiss for a 
clerical error then become an easy way of disposing of the case without 
addressing difficult issues potentially making new law -- law that at least 
some people would find objectionable? 
I think it would be inappropriate for me to try to speak with the 
motion judge, and thus I can only speculate about his reasons.  I do not 
condemn any of them.  Although I find it important to avoid deciding 
civil litigation on the basis of procedural formalisms, formalism may be 
appropriate in criminal contexts.  Formalism gives defendants important 
protection against the state when the state comes after them:  as leading 
scholars of New York criminal law once wrote, “justice not dispatched 
by tested instruments [is] vulnerable,” and “proper forms” are the “grand 
bulwark of . . . freedom & safety.”59  Obviously, I think that, when 
mistakes on the part of government threaten to inconvenience individuals 
by, for instance, requiring them to appear extra times in court, the 
government and not the individuals ought to bear the consequences of 
the government’s mistakes. 
The final possible reason for granting the December 3 motion to 
dismiss is the most problematic of the three.  On the one hand, legal 
process theorists such as Alexander Bickel argue that courts should use 
procedural devices to avoid deciding difficult substantive issues that can 
lead to the making or modification of law.60  These politically salient 
issues, according to Bickel, should be left to politically responsive 
officials and institutions – Congresspeople, state and local legislators, 
and elected executive officials, who will resolve them to the satisfaction 
of the people.61 Whatever the motion judge’s intentions, what he 
accomplished by his decision to dismiss the entire case because of the 
 
59 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW 
YORK:  A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1664-1776) xxv, 607 (1944).   
60 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 111-99 (2d ed. 1962). 
61 Id.  
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misnaming of New York University School of Law as a defendant was 
to leave difficult issues to the political process. 
The problem, however, with leaving issues to the political 
process is that the process may be structured in a fashion that will 
inescapably produce law that is skewed in favor of insiders and against 
those unable to participate in the relevant politics.  Such is the claim I 
made about the highly democratic procedures followed by the Village of 
Cedarhurst in deciding where to install stop signs and about the 
proliferation of stop signs that has resulted.  Doesn’t it become necessary, 
when the structure of the political process inevitably produces bad laws, 
to rely on courts to rectify the law and keep the institutions of democratic 
government functioning fairly? 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, I need to emphasize my positive experience with 
police officers.  Over the years, I have known many -- as friends, as first 
responders helping me when I have been victimized by crime, and as 
adversaries at traffic stops.  I have routinely found the police to be polite 
and professional.  Of course, there are rogue cops.  There are rogues in 
every profession.  A few officers will kill, will prosecute those they know 
to be innocent, and will lie.  But I have never met such a rogue. 
Police officers necessarily exercise vast power.62  As first 
responders to crimes that are in progress, they employ superior force, 
sometimes lethally.63  They also make initial judgments about who is 
guilty and who is innocent.64  If they think a person is innocent, that 
person is unlikely ever to be prosecuted.  If they think a person guilty and 
set the wheels of the criminal process in motion, that person will suffer 
grievously, even if ultimately found innocent.  As first responders to 
traffic accidents, the police write reports that often determine the 
outcome of subsequent tort litigation.65  Such power on the part of first 
responders is both necessary and inevitable.  Its existence does not create 
a police state. 
In a polity governed by the rule of law, officials from the highest 
to the lowest are bound by law and by requirements of fair play.  
 
62 John P. Gross, Judge, Jury, and Executioner: The Excessive use of Deadly Force by 
Police Officers, 21 TEX J. ON C.L. & C.R. 155, 163 (2016). 
63 Id. at 157. 
64 Id. at 180. 
65 Id. at 167.  
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Government is able to employ the law to achieve its policy objectives, 
but it also must obey the law, even when obedience impedes achievement 
of its objectives.  In addition, government must give all societal interest 
groups a fair opportunity to participate in the lawmaking process.  In an 
authoritarian police state, in contrast, government compels those in its 
power to obey the laws it enacts to achieve its objectives, but government 
is bound by no law.  It was such a police state that I confronted when I 
acted on the basis of my economic and environmental concerns after 
receiving a traffic ticket. 
The Nassau County Traffic and Parking Violations Bureau has 
displayed itself as a paradigmatic example of an emerging American 
police state in the following seven respects: 
First, it refused to obey law initially formulated to assist 
government when that law impeded achievement of its objectives.      In 
spite of Byrne,66 where a state Supreme Court justice ruled that the city 
could rely on federal law to avoid the installation of a stop sign and thus 
to avoid the payment of damages for negligence when the lack of a sign 
may have contributed to an accident,67 the Nassau Traffic and Parking 
Agency has so far avoided addressing the important issue of whether 
federal law binds municipalities as well as providing them with an excuse 
in connection with the placement of stop signs.68  Whether the traffic 
agency does not see the issue, is too burned out to address it, is so 
confident of the right answer that it finds no explanation necessary, or 
sees itself as a collection agency rather than a court, I do not know. 
Second, there is my suspicion that the Agency tolerates ex parte 
communications.  I was required to submit my papers to opposing 
counsel as well as to the court.  Presumably counsel wanted a copy of my 
papers so that he or she could act in some fashion in response to the 
submission, but counsel never revealed his or her action to me or 
submitted any papers to me.  Knowledge is power, and opposing 
counsel’s knowledge of my interactions with the court, without 
disclosing whether he or she had any interactions, and, if so, what they 
were, conferred power on government that government did not permit 
me to share.  Ex parte communications are inconsistent with due process 
of law. 
 
66 Byrne, 851 N.Y.S.2d 56. 
67 Id. 
68 For a case holding federal standards to be binding, see People v. Sheridan, 105 Misc. 2d 317, 
320 (Just. Ct. 1980). 
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Third, there is the black box of judicial decision-making.  The 
motion judge assigned to my case disposed of my initial motion to 
dismiss by denying it, either on the merits or on the basis of a rule about 
timeliness that no one without knowledge of the inner workings of the 
court could have anticipated.  I assume the judge knew what he decided, 
but when I asked him for clarification, he declined to give it.  Knowledge 
is power, and the judge’s refusal to let me know what he had decided 
conferred power on government that government did not permit me to 
share.   
Fourth, there is the law firm of traffic lawyers that I asked to 
represent me.  The legal profession, as I understand it, has a duty to 
provide representation to defendants so as to give them power in the 
litigation process as equal as possible to that of the prosecutor. The 
lawyer’s duty is not to cozy up to the prosecutor to help the latter achieve 
the result -- guilt -- that the prosecutor wants.  Of course, a law firm that 
builds a good relationship with prosecutors does to some extent increase 
the power of defendants by obtaining better deals than defendants could 
obtain by themselves.  Nonetheless, in doing so, the law firm makes itself 
part of the police state system. 
Fifth, there is the behavior of Hon. [Anonymous] when I came 
before him to seek advice.  He had every right to tell me he could not 
provide advice.  But that is not what he did.  Instead, he intimidated me.  
Perhaps that was not the purpose of his behavior, but it was the result.  
Any law professor knows that he or she cannot begin an effective 
Socratic dialogue by asking a student an open-ended question, like what 
are the two things you can do.  One answer is stay in the room; another 
is to leave.  A law professor who asks such a question either has not 
thought through how to conduct a class, or is trying to intimidate a 
student by making him or her look stupid -- like a deer on a dark highway 
with headlights shining in its eyes. 
Sixth, there is the clerical carelessness of the staff of the Traffic 
and Parking Agency.  That carelessness imposes costs on others.  If I like 
most defendants had not been represented by counsel, the carelessness 
would have resulted in suspension of my license and possible jail time.  
It did cost time.  As a tenured professor who attended court during a break 
in classes, I did not lose salary as a result of having to spend a morning 
in court.  But I suspect that many of the defendants in court with me that 
morning did lose pay -- money they desperately need to provide 
necessities for their families. 
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Seventh, there is the failure of the judges, lawyers, and others 
who work at the Nassau County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency 
to listen to the community they are sworn to serve and to appreciate how 
it views the Agency’s behavior.  I asked the Agency, which is part of the 
Nassau County District Court and is staffed by District Court judges, to 
address a serious legal issue about the interplay of federal law grounded 
in environmental, economic, and foreign policy concerns, on the one 
hand, and state law enacted to protect automobile and pedestrian safety, 
on the other.  I presented that issue as clearly in my motion papers as I 
have tried to present it in this article.  But no one at the Traffic and 
Parking Agency heard what I had to say.  Nor do they seem to know what 
the thousands of people who appear before them, most of whom are 
members of racial or ethnic minorities, think about the nature of the 
American state.  From conversations I have had with some of those 
people, they do not see Nassau County as a polity governed by the rule 
of law.  They see it as a police state where men with uniforms, badges, 
and guns oppress them.  I engaged in this litigation -- I have written this 
essay -- in an effort to change, even if only slowly and marginally, the 
behavior of the Nassau County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency 
and other institutions like it so that I and others can see those institutions 
as agencies of a government of laws, not of power. 
Thus the police typically are not the problem.  The problem 
begins with legislatures, which enact laws or fail to enact them, often on 
behalf of narrow interest groups.  Legislatures often ignore limits on their 
own or the police’s power or otherwise put the police in untenable 
situations.  The proliferation of stop signs in my locality is one example.  
The failure to keep guns out of the hands of dangerous criminals is 
another.  Such legislative behavior obliges police to enforce laws they 
should not be enforcing and to use excessive force that they should avoid 
using.  The behavior makes the police -- the government entity that 
citizens see on the ground -- look bad.  But it is the legislature that is at 
fault. 
Then there are the lawyers and judges in entities such as the 
Nassau County Traffic Agency.  Collectively, whatever their intentions, 
the lawyers and judges with whom I dealt in Nassau County have created 
an institution that has the effect of intimidating those who appear before 
it and coercing them to pay tribute to government at the lowest possible 
cost to government in collecting it.  It is not a fair adjudicatory body 
committed to doing justice, but the key cog in an emerging police state 
that subordinates the people who come into contact with it, grabs money 
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from them, and helps to keep them in their subordinate place.  I have 
enough power and resources to fight it.  But people of color and other 
minorities do not.  No wonder, they feel abused. 
Of course, Nassau County may be an aberration, although I doubt 
it.  Assuming Nassau is typical, American society deludes itself in 
thinking that reforming the police will resolve the crisis that exists in 
relations between government and minority communities and the poor.  
The problem is higher up, with legislatures that enact laws promoting the 
concerns of narrow, special interests and with bureaucratic institutions, 
largely staffed by judges and lawyers, that enforce those laws through 
coercion and intimidation.   
Ultimately the problem lies with voters, such as the residents of 
Cedarhurst at the intersection of Washington Ave. and Summit Ave. who 
want stop signs that will reduce traffic speeds near their houses, who do 
not appreciate or care about the signs’ negative impact on others, and 
who either are ignorant about or supportive of the coercive, intimidating 
character of law enforcement agencies.  There also is a problem in that 
the structure of the American polity facilitates special interest legislation 
and impedes the flow of information about how government functions.  
Thus, if we really want to avert the emergence of a police state, we need 
to reform governmental structures, ranging from village boards of 
trustees and traffic and parking violation agencies to Congress and the 
federal entities that enforce its will.  Above all, we need to better educate 
citizens to vote for the common, public interest rather than their own self-
interest -- to recognize, that is, that we as a community will rise or fall as 
one and that a few people voting to promote their narrow interests cannot 
in the long run manipulate everyone else consistently with the 
maintenance of a democratic polity. 
Until voters recognize the need to be part of a larger community 
that takes all interests equally into account, we will continue to live in the 
legal world that my proceeding before the Nassau County Traffic and 
Parking Violations Agency exemplifies.  In that world, people like me 
with knowledge, resources, and connections face no significant costs in 
resisting the commands of the police state:  if we resist long enough, we 
may win, and we know that, at worst, we can go to court, plead guilty to 
jaywalking, and pay tribute in an amount lower than what we saved on 
gasoline by ignoring stop signs.  Poor people and people of color, in 
contrast, must capitulate; paying a fine is much more costly to them than 
to me, and an effort to resist can lead to disaster, as mine almost did when 
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the Traffic Agency misnamed the defendant and, but for the presence of 
my lawyer, would have mismailed the notice of trial. 
No wonder poor people and minorities are angry.  They see 
entities like the Nassau County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency 
transferring their limited wealth and well-being to people like me, who 
do not need it and, in many instances, do not even know they are 
obtaining it.  Worst of all, they see the system manipulating procedures 
so that people who attempt to use law to facilitate change, as I did in this 
proceeding, find themselves banging their heads against an impregnable 
wall fortifying existing legal and political structures.   
Poor people and people of color lost when the prosecution against 
me was dismissed for some unknown reason.  I lost as well.  We all did. 
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